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The story of international criminal justice does not end when the verdict is read; for both the 
affected communities and for the individual accused, the story goes on. This article explores 
the situation facing some accused before the International Criminal Court (ICC) once their 
trial is over, their sentence (if convicted) is served, and they are released from custody. In 
many cases, the former ICC accused will simply return home and continue on with a life 
similar to the one they led before their ICC trial. But for some this will not be possible, 
particularly where the situation in their home country is such that they would be at risk if 
they returned there. In that case, they will need to find another country where they can safely 
reside, but such efforts will often be hindered by a reluctance on the part of states to host 
persons accused of international crimes, no matter the outcome of the trial. In these cases, 
such individuals can often become stuck in the legal limbo of being ‘undesirable but 
unreturnable’ (hereinafter, ‘UbU’): undesirable because they are unwelcome in other states, 
but unreturnable because they cannot be returned home. This article explores what the 
expression ‘undesirable but unreturnable’ means, how the situation that it describes arises 
in general international law, and in particular how the situation arises in the ICC context. 
The article then looks at the practice of the ICC to date in dealing with former accused who 
face being caught in the ‘UbU’ limbo, and goes on to set out three ways in which the ICC 
could play a bigger role in addressing the issue.  
 
1. Introduction 
The story of international criminal justice does not end when the verdict is read, the judges 
rise, and the accused is lead away from the court. The fall-out from the atrocities and crimes 
that led to the trial in the first place lingers on for the affected communities and victims, and 
the discussions surrounding the conclusion of international criminal justice often centre on 
this aspect. But the story goes on for the individual accused also; many of those convicted 
will eventually be released, and along with acquitted persons, must return to ‘normality’ and 
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a life of freedom. The subject matter of this article is the position that some former accused 
before the International Criminal Court (ICC) may find themselves in upon release, and how 
they might become trapped in the legal limbo of being ‘undesirable but unreturnable’ 
(hereinafter, UbU): unable to find a new home, but unable to return to their old one.   
When an individual’s involvement with the ICC concludes, either by acquittal or 
because they have served the duration of their sentence,1 the next step is release. The wish of 
many former accused is to return to their home country, and indeed this is the easiest option 
given that their country of nationality is obliged to receive them. But their ability to return 
safely greatly depends on the political situation in their country at the time of their release. 
Individuals tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are 
often welcomed home in their respective countries as heroes, returning to their lives and even 
running for public office.2 The experience of those tried by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has been very different, with individuals claiming to face 
violence and persecution if they return to Rwanda, where Tutsi governments have been in 
power since the genocide.3 Indeed, there have been challenges in this regard since modern 
international criminal justice began. The three defendants acquitted by the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg following the Second World War were rearrested 
immediately afterwards and retried in domestic proceedings.4 
No general statements are yet possible about the ICC, given the range of situations 
under investigation and the differences between them. There is clearly no difficulty for 
former ICC accused from the Kenya situation in returning home, but accused from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have raised valid concerns about their safety in their 
home country.5 For some ICC accused therefore, building a life after a trial at the ICC will 
not be as simple as boarding an airplane and beginning a life at home in freedom.   
Section 2 of the article sets out what is meant by the expression ‘undesirable but 
unreturnable’, its legal background, and how the issue arises in international law generally. 
                                                 
1It is possible for international criminal trials to end in ways that do not involve acquittal or release on 
completion of sentence. For example, charges may not be confirmed (e.g. Mbarushimana), or a case may be 
ceased for lack of state cooperation (e.g. Kenyatta, Ruto). However, this paper will be confined to acquittal and 
release on completion of sentence.   
2 Naturally, this has not always been the case. For more information, see among others B. Holá and J. van Wijk, 
'Life after Conviction at International Criminal Tribunals: An Empirical Overview', 12 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2014)109, at 130 and K.J. Heller, 'What Happens to the Acquitted?' 21 Leiden Journal 
of International Law (2008) 663, at 664–665.  
3 Hóla and van Wijk, Heller, ibid. 
4 A. Walker, Nazi War Trials (Pocket Essentials, 2006), 149. 
5 Concerns were raised by the European Court of Human Rights in Z.M. v. France, Appl. No. 40042/11, 
judgment of 14 November 2013, § 66. 
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The same section then explains how UbU situations arise in the ICC context, and the two 
forms they can take. Section 3 explores the limited practice of the ICC in situations where a 
former accused is at risk of becoming UbU, including both the legal decisions rendered by 
the Court and alternative ways in which events could have unfolded. This is followed in 
Section 4 by proposals on how the ICC could play a greater role in preventing such situations 
from arising in the future. As will become clear, there are more actors than just the ICC 
involved in a situation concerning UbU former ICC accused, but the focus has been restricted 
to the ICC alone, on which there is already much to discuss.  
 
2. Legal Background: UbU Individuals in International Law and in the ICC Context 
One of the fundamental principles of the 1951 Refugee Convention is that an individual who 
is outside their country of origin can ask for refugee protection if they would be at risk of 
persecution if returned home. The state in which protection is requested will be termed ‘the 
protection state’. But there is no absolute right to refugee status; even if a person meets the 
criteria to qualify as a refugee, they can still be excluded from protection under certain 
circumstances. Particularly relevant for this article are the grounds for exclusion listed in 
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. Under this provision, a person can be excluded from 
refugee status if there are serious reasons for considering that they have committed a war 
crime, crime against humanity, or acted contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations. A person who has been excluded from refugee status is not entitled to remain in the 
country where protection was requested and may be removed. However, that does not mean 
that the individual has reached the end of the road. Their transfer back to their country of 
origin may still be prevented if they qualify for complementary protection under human 
rights law.  
Certain human rights law provisions have been interpreted so as to entail their own 
prohibition on removal. The landmark case for this was Soering6 before the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR), whereby the United Kingdom was prevented from transferring an 
individual to the United States, as to do so would have exposed him to a real risk of inhuman 
treatment, thereby violating Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Other provisions have since been interpreted to contain similar prohibitions, including Article 
2 and Article 6 ECHR,7 as have other human rights treaties, including the International 
                                                 
6 Soering v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 14038/88 , judgment of 7 July 1989.   
7 See generally M. den Heijer, 'Whose Rights and Which Rights? The Continuing Story of Non-Refoulement 
under the European Convention on Human Rights', 10 European Journal of Migration & Law (2008) 277; for 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.8 Unlike under the Refugee Convention, there are no 
exclusion clauses for complementary protection. If to return an individual to another state 
would expose him or her to a real risk of violations of certain rights then, regardless of how 
egregious the person’s past conduct may be, they cannot be returned. The co-existence of 
these two protection regimes gives rise to what are termed ‘undesirable but unreturnable’ 
individuals. Certain characteristics of their past conduct make them ‘undesirable’ and allow 
for their exclusion from refugee status, but as they are still at risk if returned, they are 
‘unreturnable’ under human rights law. From the protection state’s point of view, the problem 
of UbU individuals is that the state is precluded from removing an unwelcome individual 
from its territory. From the individual’s standpoint, the problem is the unregulated nature of 
their position. As refugees they would have a regularized status, with prescribed rights and 
duties; their exclusion from that status means they are not entitled to those rights. The 
complementary protection regime is much less well developed, and does not offer the 
individual a standard regularized status. This can result in a form of legal limbo, where the 
individual cannot be removed from the protection state, but equally does not have access to 
important rights in that state, such as being able to work, to access education, to have 
assistance in finding housing or other amenities, etc.9   
Having set out this general legal background to the UbU problem, we can turn to see 
the — basically two — ways it arises in the ICC context. The first instance does not largely 
differ from the description in the above paragraphs, in that it concerns a state having an 
unwelcome individual on its territory that it cannot remove. In order for a person to be tried 
by the ICC, they must be relocated to the seat of the Court in the Netherlands (‘the host 
state’, in this case), thereby transferring them outside of their country of nationality.10 If they 
are acquitted, they will be released from the custody of the ICC detention centre in The 
Hague, meaning that the person will be released in the Netherlands. If, on the other hand, 
they are convicted, they will be sent to a third state to serve their sentence (this state will be 
                                                                                                                                                       
Art. 6 case law, see Appl. nos 46827/99 and 46951/99 (Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Judgment of 4 
February 2005), Appl.  No. 8139/09 (Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, judgment 17 January 2012).    
8 General Comment 31 (80): The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed Upon StatesParties to the 
Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, § 31, and as an example of a case before the 
Human Rights Committee, see Ng v. Canada (Communication No. 469/1991), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991, 7 January 1994. 
9 For more details, see J. Reijven and J. van Wijk, 'Caught in Limbo: How Alleged Perpetrators of International 
Crimes who Applied for Asylum in the Netherlands are Affected by a Fundamental System Error in 
International Law', 26 International Journal of Refugee Law (2014) 1. 
10 Unless, of course, a Dutch national is ever brought before the Court.  
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referred to as ‘the enforcement state’).11 When the convicted person’s sentence is complete, 
they will be released from custody in the enforcement state. Upon gaining his or her freedom, 
the individual may wish to return to their home country, and this is what happens in many 
cases. However, as outlined above, the security situation in the home country may sometimes 
prevent this solution, in which case the priority of the former accused person will be to find 
somewhere safe to reside.  To that end, the individual can seek asylum in the state where they 
are released, whether this be the host or the enforcement state.   
Faced with an asylum application from a former ICC accused, the host or 
enforcement state have a powerful card to play if they do not want the person residing on 
their territory: Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. Convicted persons can certainly be 
excluded; the fact that they have ‘served their time’ does not affect the application of the 
Article 1F exclusion. But even with an acquittal in hand, states can still exclude former ICC 
accused because the standard of proof for Article 1F is lower than the standard of proof 
adopted in criminal proceedings.12 That being said, where asylum-seeking-former-ICC-
accused qualify for complementary protection under human rights law, they will have a card 
that will trump Article 1F. Where this is the case, the host state or enforcement state will be 
unable to remove them, resulting in a UbU situation.   
The second instance in which the UbU problem arises in the ICC context differs 
significantly from the above scenario, and is referred to as an UbU-type problem more for 
ease of reference than for accuracy. In this situation, instead of a former ICC accused turning 
to the host state or enforcement state for protection on release from custody, the individual 
relies on the ICC alone, and remains the responsibility of the Court. The experience of the 
ICTR is a good illustration.13 When a person acquitted and released by the ICTR is unable to 
return to Rwanda, they remain on Tanzanian territory (where the Tribunal is located) but in a 
safe house under the control and responsibility of the Tribunal.14 The individual in question, 
with the assistance of the Tribunal, then goes about the difficult task of finding a state that is 
willing to host them. What makes it difficult is the reluctance on the part of states to agree to 
                                                 
11 In the past, the exclusive practice at international criminal tribunals has been to prevent convicted persons 
from serving their sentence in their home state (Hóla and van Wijk, supra note 2, at 117, Table 2). However, as 
discussed below, the ICC may be breaking away from this practice. 
12 The standard of proof for Art. 1F is ‘serious reasons for considering’, as opposed to the ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ standard of criminal law. As such, even when evidence does not suffice for a criminal conviction, it may 
justify a finding that there are ‘serious reasons for considering’ that the individual has committed a crime.  
13 It is not clear exactly why the individuals in question have not requested protection from the Tanzanian 
authorities. Possibly such applications have been made and refused. In any case the ICTR, not Tanzania, has 
retained responsibility for these individuals.  
14 For background information, see http://whenjusticeisdone.org/index.php/acquittedd (visited 15 April 2016). 
See also Heller, supra note 2, at 664. 
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host individuals that have been accused of international crimes, no matter the outcome of the 
trial. The result is that those acquitted by the ICTR have spent, and are still spending, years in 
safe houses, in a state of semi deprivation of liberty. André Ntagerura, former minister in the 
Rwandan government, was acquitted in 2004. Asylum applications submitted to France and 
Canada have been rejected, and he has lived in an ICTR safe house near the Tribunal for 
more than 10 years.15 Prosper Mugiraneza, also a former government minister, was acquitted 
in 2013 and shares this safe house.16 In these situations, the individual is unreturnable 
because they cannot return to Rwanda, but it is undesirable for the Tribunal,17 for Tanzania, 
and for the individual, that they be left in this limbo; hence the term ‘UbU’ still broadly 
applies.  For the ICTR this situation has proved a significant headache, not to mention a 
financial burden. The President of the Tribunal has issued repeated calls for ‘urgent action to 
help to find host countries’ for acquitted, and considers ‘the resettlement of persons acquitted 
by an international criminal tribunal to be a fundamental expression of the rule of law’.18 This 
has been supported by similar calls from the Security Council.19 Since the ICTR wrapped up 
operations on 31 December 2015, the issues with relocating acquitted persons have been 
inherited by the residual Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT).  
This second type of UbU issue — that has plagued the ICTR — will trouble the ICC 
also. When the Rome Statute was drafted, no provision was made for this eventuality, and so 
as the ICC continues its work, there is nothing to prevent the problems that have beset the 
ICTR from being repeated in the ICC context. 
This overview illustrates that the UbU problem affects more than just the individual 
— who is left in legal limbo — but potentially also the enforcement state, the host state, and 
the ICC. Each of the mentioned actors could play a role in addressing UbU issues in the 
                                                 
15 ‘Acquitted of Rwanda genocide, now left in legal limbo’, Daily Mail, 18 December 2014, available online at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2879322/Acquitted-Rwanda-genocide-left-legal-limbo.html 
(visited 4 January 2016). It should be noted that not all ICTR acquitted have been unsuccessful in their 
relocation efforts: Jean Mpambara, acquitted of genocide charges by the ICTR in 2007, was permitted by France 
to join his family on Mayotte, a small French island in the Indian Ocean; Bagambiki, also acquitted by the 
ICTR, now lives in Belgium. (Heller, supra note 2, at 669). 
16 Ibid. See Heller also for a detailed overview of the legal and factual challenges that persons acquitted by the 
ICTR face in getting their asylum claims heard and accepted from the safe house, at 668–675.  
17 The Tribunal experiences not only reputational but also financial concerns, given that maintaining the safe 
houses is a costly business. Each safe house resident costs the Tribunal approximately $1,500 a month for rent, 
telephone, guards, etc. ‘Rwanda court’s forgotten men pose challenge to international justice’, Reuters, 28 
September 2014, available online at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-justice-insight-
idUSKCN0HN0NK20140928 (visited 17 April 2016).  
18 Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. A/66/209-S/2011/472, 29 July 2011, § 
87; Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. A/70/218-S/2015/577, 31 July 2015, § 
65. 
19 SC Res. 2054, 29 June 2012, § 6. 
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context of ICC proceedings, but this article will focus only on the options available to the 
ICC itself, leaving the role of other actors to further work. Before examining the ICC’s 
potential role in detail, it is helpful to first discuss the ICC’s limited practice concerning UbU 
issues, and consider the alternative ways in which the practice could have turned out. This 
analysis aims at illustrating the pitfalls in the way that the ICC is currently addressing the 
issue, in preparation for the solutions proposed in Section 4.  
 
3. The ICC Practice To Date: Unfulfilled Potential  
In its limited practice to date, the ICC has made some attempt to deal with, and in some 
instances pre-empt, UbU situations. At the time of writing, there are two individuals with 
regard to whom the practice of the ICC in this matter is relevant to the discussion: Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, the only person acquitted so far by the ICC, and Germain Katanga, the first 
person released by the ICC on completion of his sentence. In the end, neither Ngudjolo nor 
Katanga were left in an UbU situation; however, this outcome could easily have been 
different. The catalogue of decisions surrounding Ngudjolo’s situation provide an insight into 
the ICC’s efforts to deal with possible UbU issues and where they went awry; with regard to 
Katanga we can only speculate as to the ICC’s intentions at the moment. This section will 
first describe what happened in the Ngudjolo and Katanga cases, and second will put forward 
alternative ways in which the cases might have developed. In this way the author hopes to 
show the role the ICC has so far taken in these situations, and highlight its limitations.  
Ngudjolo was acquitted by the ICC of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
allegedly committed during an attack on the village of Bogoro, in the Ituri region of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).20 The decision to acquit was made by the Trial 
Chamber in 2012 and confirmed on appeal in 2015. An application to keep Ngudjolo in 
detention pending his appeal was rejected21 and so, after the first instance judgment, the ICC 
set about making arrangements for his release.22 The Netherlands had declined to allow 
Ngudjolo to reside on its territory pending the appeal, but before he could be transferred 
outside the Netherlands, the UN travel ban imposed on him needed to be lifted, even 
                                                 
20 For an overview of the Ngudjolo case, visit the ICC website: www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/ICC-01-
04-02-12/Pages/default.aspx (visited 4 January 2016). 
21 Decision on the request of the Prosecutor of 19 December 2012 for suspensive effect, Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-
01/04-02/12-12), Appeals Chamber, 20 December 2012. 
22 For more details see a decision of the Dutch Council of State, the highest court of appeal in the Netherlands 
for administrative law issues, including immigration law. Council of State, 12 November 2013, 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:2050. 
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temporarily. The ICC and the Netherlands reached an agreement allowing Ngudjolo to 
remain in the Netherlands, in a designated ICC hotel room, 23 while the travel ban was dealt 
with and arrangements were made. Due to a last minute administrative problem with that 
hotel room, this agreement fell through, and the Dutch authorities sought to deport him 
instead. Ngudjolo prevented his imminent removal by making a claim for asylum.  
Perhaps predictably, the application for refugee status was refused on the basis of 
Article 1F. The Netherlands considered that, even though Ngudjolo had been acquitted of the 
Bogoro attack, there were grounds to consider that he was involved in other atrocities, as well 
as holding leading positions in a number of military groups in the periods of time not 
addressed by the ICC case.24 That being said, even if the Netherlands were making an 
assessment based on the same evidence presented before the ICC, Ngudjolo could still have 
been excluded under Article 1F. As Heller points out, an acquittal means that the prosecution 
failed to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt, not that there are not serious reasons for 
considering that the individual committed a crime.25 Ngudjolo’s claim for complementary 
protection under the ECHR was also unsuccessful, as it was deemed to be without merit for 
lack of evidence.26 Ultimately, despite refusing to grant protection, the Netherlands did not 
return Ngudjolo to the DRC, and he was allowed to remain on Dutch territory awaiting the 
outcome of his appeal. When the Appeals Chamber confirmed the acquittal, the decision to 
exclude him from refugee status was upheld, and in May 2015 he was returned to the DRC.27  
Thus, Ngudjolo did not end up in the UbU situation, as his claim for protection from removal 
under Article 3 ECHR was not successful. However, a different outcome would have been 
more than plausible. There are two alternative ways the Ngudjolo situation could have played 
out, each of which has an UbU dimension. First, the administrative error with the hotel room 
that led to the asylum claim might not have happened, and Ngudjolo might have resided in a 
hotel designated as an ‘ICC zone’28 until a state willing to receive him had been found. This 
                                                 
23 According to the agreement between the Netherlands and the ICC, Ngudjolo would temporarily reside in a 
hotel at the Amsterdam Schiphol International Airport. This particular hotel has two sections, one of which is in 
the international airport zone. For this section, guests are not required to pass through Dutch customs control. 
The other side of the hotel is on Dutch territory proper. The agreement was for Ngudjolo to stay on the 
‘international’ side, but the reservation had been made for the ‘Dutch’ side. The Dutch authorities, it seems, 
were not willing to allow him to stay on ‘their’ side, and sought to remove him. For more details, see ibid. 
24 T. de Boer and M. Zieck, 'ICC Witnesses and Acquitted Suspects Seeking Asylum in the Netherlands: An 
Overview of the Jurisdictional Battles between the ICC and Its Host state', 27 IJRL (2015) 573, footnote 153. 
25 Heller, supra note 2, at 671. 
26 Council of State, 15 October 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2014:3833 at § 4.4 and § 9.1. 
27 For a detailed examination of the Dutch domestic decisions in the Ngudjolo case, see de Boer and Zieck, 
supra note 24, at 593 onwards.  
28 This is potentially a very interesting concept, but the Council of State’s decision does not provide a precise 
explanation of what this would have meant.  
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scenario would have been similar to the approach taken by the ICTR (and now by the MICT), 
where acquitted persons are accommodated in safe houses in Tanzania while a host country is 
identified.29 This presupposes that Ngudjolo had opted not to involve the Netherlands, and 
instead relied exclusively on the ICC to remedy his situation. Second, Ngudjolo’s Article 3 
claim might have been successful, making the Netherlands the protection state unable to 
remove him. Indeed, The Hague District Court in an earlier decision determined that 
Ngudjolo could well have had an Article 3 claim, although this was overruled on appeal.30 In 
different ways for the different parties, both of these outcomes would have been unwelcome. 
Ngudjolo in particular would have been at a disadvantage: in one scenario he would spend his 
days in a hotel, waiting under restrictive conditions for an indefinite amount of time for a 
country to accept him; in the other scenario he would live in the Netherlands but with an 
unregularized status and great uncertainty about his future.   
In what could be perceived as an attempt to prevent a similar situation occurring for 
persons released on completion of sentence, the ICC in the case of Germain Katanga took a 
rather unusual step.31 Katanga had remained at the ICC detention centre since his conviction 
in May 2014. Having served two thirds of his prison sentence, Katanga’s sentence was 
reduced and his release date set for 18 January 2016.32 With his release imminent, the ICC 
designated the DRC as the enforcement state, and transferred Katanga there in December 
2015 to serve the rest of his sentence. In the practice of previous international criminal 
tribunals, a convicted person had never been sent to their country of nationality (or, where 
they are different, the country where the crimes took place) to serve their sentence.33 In a 
statement to the press, Katanga said that his intention was to try to join the regular DRC 
army, and if not become a farmer in his native region.34 Recent developments indicate that 
this seems unlikely, as Katanga’s release date came and went without his release, due to the 
fact that DRC authorities are pursuing domestic criminal proceedings against him.35  
                                                 
29 Heller, supra note 2; infra notes 47 and 48. 
30 The Hague District Court (siting in Amsterdam), 28 May 2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:6711, at § 11.2 and 
11.3. 
31 This is speculation on the part of the author. The ICC has not made the motivation for this course of action 
public, nor is it likely to.  
32 Decision on the review concerning reduction of sentence of Mr Germain Katanga, Katanga (ICC-01/04-
01/07-3615), Appeals Chamber, 13 November 2015.   
33 Hóla and van Wijk, supra note 2, at 117, Table 2. 
34 J. Easterday, ‘ICC Judges to Consider Katanga’s Early Release’, International Justice Monitor, 2 October 
2015, available online at http://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/10/icc-judges-to-consider-katangas-early-release/ 
(visited 4 January 2016). 
35 Human Rights Watch, ‘DR Congo: ICC Convict Faces Domestic Charges’, 23 December 2015, available 
online at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/23/dr-congo-icc-convict-faces-domestic-charges (visited 4 January 
2016). 
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It appears Katanga did not oppose his transfer to the DRC, even though he may have 
known that he would face charges on his return.36 But had he chosen to oppose the transfer, 
he may have had grounds to do so, and so once again it is worth considering the alternative 
ways in which Katanga’s story could have played out. In the first alternative scenario, the 
ICC did not designate the DRC as the enforcement state and did not transfer Katanga there 
towards the end of his sentence. In that case, he would have been released directly from the 
custody of the ICC detention centre in The Hague on 18 January 2016 and could have sought 
protection in the Netherlands. This protection would have comprised complementary 
protection under Articles 3 and 6 ECHR (it is assumed that an asylum application would have 
been rejected under Article 1F). In terms of Article 3, concerns have been raised by the 
ECtHR that individuals returning to the DRC are at risk of ill treatment and torture if they are 
deemed to be opponents of the Kabila regime.37 As for Article 6, Katanga could have pointed 
to the charges that the DRC authorities were planning to bring, and argue that the trial 
conditions in the DRC were so unsatisfactory as to lead to a flagrant denial of justice.38 Such 
concerns have in fact been raised by Katanga’s ICC defence team following his return to the 
DRC. The defence requested that the ICC prevent national proceedings from going ahead, on 
the basis that, inter alia, Katanga would not get a fair trial.39 As such, in the alternative 
scenario where Katanga was not transferred to the DRC, it is feasible that a complementary 
protection request would have been successful. In this eventuality, Katanga would have be 
safe for the time being from return to the DRC, but would be in an unregularized UbU 
situation in the Netherlands.  
In the second alternative scenario, Katanga would have been transferred to a third 
state to serve the remainder of his sentence, instead of the DRC. In that case, he could have 
requested asylum and/or complementary protection in the enforcement state. Had he been 
excluded on the basis of Article 1F, but successful in claiming complementary protection, 
Katanga would have become an UbU individual and the enforcement state would have 
become his protection state.  
                                                 
36 Preliminary observations by the defence concerning the continued and unlawful detention of Mr Germain 
Katanga by the Democratic Republic of Congo, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3635), The Presidency, 22 January 
2016, at §§ 60–66, in which the Defence counsel communicates that they had some indication that charges 
would be brought, but not of which ones exactly.  
37 Supra note 5. 
38 European Court of Human Rights, 'Guide on Article 6: Right to a Fair Trial (criminal limb)', 2014, at 53. 
39 Supra note 36, from § 46. The ICC would be empowered to act in this sense under Art. 108(1) ICCSt., which 
states: ‘A sentenced person in the custody of the state of enforcement shall not be subject to prosecution or 
punishment or to extradition to a third state for any conduct engaged in prior to that person’s delivery to the 
state of enforcement, unless such prosecution, punishment or extradition has been approved by the Court at the 
request of the state of enforcement.’  
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In either of these alternative scenarios, it is also possible that the ICC could have 
taken a more proactive role (as it initially did in the Ngudjolo case) and arrange for Katanga 
to remain in the host/enforcement state under the auspices of the ICC while another state was 
found willing to accept him. However, as described above, this could also have led to an UbU 
situation of another type, with Katanga confined to a hotel room or safe house for an 
indefinite period of time.  
It is certainly arguable that the ICC played a role in avoiding, or attempting to avoid, 
UbU situations developing with regard to Ngudjolo and Katanga. In Ngudjolo’s case, initially 
arrangements were made for him to remain in an ICC designated hotel room while his 
situation was addressed, and the possibility of an asylum application was not discussed. As 
for Katanga, the ICC ensured that, at the time of his release, he would be in his country of 
nationality. Both the cases themselves and the alternative outcomes show that the ICC’s role 
was in fact very limited. When the arrangements for Ngudjolo fell through, the Court took a 
back seat and left the matter largely to the Netherlands to resolve according to its own 
obligations. A similar approach would likely have been taken if Katanga had been sent to an 
enforcement state other than the DRC and sought asylum there. If either Ngudjolo or Katanga 
had ended up in an ICC designated hotel room or safe house awaiting admittance from a 
state, the ICC would have been forced to wait as well. In these different permutations of the 
UbU problem, the ICC’s currently limited role would not have allowed it to render much 
assistance. Because the high probability that UbU issues will continue to arise at the ICC in 
the future, it is worth exploring ways in which the ICC could play a stronger and more 
effective role.  
 
4. How Can the ICC Facilitate Solutions to the Problem? 
There are three avenues that would allow the ICC to play a larger role in addressing potential 
UbU issues. The first of these is for the ICC to be a focal point of coordination and 
communication, the aim of which would be to find a state for acquitted or released persons to 
reside in. The second and third avenues are ways of allowing former defendants to return 
home by minimizing the risk they would face, thereby removing the ‘unreturnable’ part of 
UbU. These involve using the protection infrastructure that may already exist in the home 
country, and/or assurances between the ICC and the home state.  
 
A. Coordination and Communication 
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The ICC is an international organization with presence on the international stage. Through 
the Assembly of State Parties, the Presidency and the Registry, the ICC has contacts with 
different states and an overview of cooperation between states and the Court. Given this 
position, the ICC is well placed to act as a hub and focal point for discussions regarding 
acquitted and released persons. In the case that these individuals are unable to return home 
when their involvement with the ICC concludes, the Court could coordinate the process of 
seeking a host state. This is preferable to each state dealing only bilaterally with the 
individual seeking protection, as it allows for a dialogue between states on how to resolve the 
issue collectively. A cooperative discussion, coordinated by the ICC, could help prevent the 
situation where each state refrains from acting in the expectation that another will, and 
promotes more equitable burden sharing. It is certainly possible that the ICC already plays 
some such role, but little information is publicly available. The President of ICTR has been 
open about the fact that the Tribunal’s Registrar acts as a ‘channel of communication’ 
between the Tribunal and the diplomatic community. Between 2014 and 2015 the Registrar 
transmitted more than 114 notes verbales and other correspondence relating to securing state 
assistance with the relocation of acquitted and released persons. With the closure of the 
Tribunal, this function has passed to the MICT.40 This precedent shows that the role proposed 
for the ICC is by no means unheard of.  
There is no explicit provision in the ICC legal framework that could be cited as a 
basis for the ICC taking on this role. However, there are a number of provisions which 
arguably support the spirit of the idea. The Regulations of the Court and the Regulations of 
the Registry entrust the Registry with ensuring that a detained individual is provided with 
consular and diplomatic assistance from their country of nationality, or where applicable, an 
international body.41 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) provide that the Registry 
makes agreements with states for the relocation of witnesses, and in the same vein the 
Registry has made an agreement for hosting persons granted interim release.42 Lastly, the 
Registry is assigned the task of being the channel of communication for the Court.43 It is true 
that none of these provisions deal with the question in hand directly, but they demonstrate a 
broader role for the Registry in coordinating and communicating with states on the issue of 
individuals who are outside of their country of nationality. It is not too much of a leap to 
suggest that the ICC could perceive itself as having a de facto responsibility to assist in 
                                                 
40 Report of the ICTR 2015, supra note 18, at § 32. 
41 Reg. 152, ICC Regulations of the Registry; Reg. 98, ICC Regulations of the Court. 
42 Rule 16, ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
43 Rule 13, ibid.  
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resolving UbU situations involving former defendants.44 Indeed, the ICTR Registrar 
considered the Tribunal to have such a de facto responsibility to assist acquitted persons in 
finding a host state and acquiring travel documents and money for the journey.45  
Advantages come with the ICC adopting (or furthering) its role as coordinator for 
former defendants seeking protection. If the problem is resolved prior to the person’s release, 
UbU issues do not arise. However, the extent of the ICC’s role and impact are limited. 
Importantly, it can only coordinate discussion and encourage states to host the concerned 
individuals, but it can by no means compel states to do so. ICC Trial Chamber II was correct 
in stating that it cannot use the ICC Statute’s cooperation mechanisms to compel a state to 
receive an individual on its territory.46 To do so would exceed the purpose of those 
mechanisms and intrude into domestic considerations of immigration policy, traditionally tied 
to state sovereignty.  
These limitations are well known at the ICTR.47 When the Tribunal was closing down, 
there was much discussion on the acquitted persons’ fate. Despite years of talks and 
negotiations,48 no progress had been made in identifying a host state for these individuals. 
The ICTR Registrar acknowledged the Tribunal’s restricted role in these matters, due to the 
limited diplomatic influence it has over the concerned countries.49 Much will depend 
therefore on the ICC’s diplomatic clout..  
 
B. Existing Infrastructures of Protection  
The impact of an ICC trial on the population of an affected area is far reaching. It is not 
simply a case of arresting a suspect and removing them to The Hague; there are witnesses, 
                                                 
44 ‘Article 107’, in W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford 
University Press, 2010), at 1086 
45 R.K.G. Amoussouga, 'The ICTR's Challenges in the Relocation of Acquitted Persons, Released Prisoners and 
Protected Witnesses at the Forum Between Offices of the Prosecutors of UN Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals and 
National Prosecuting Authorities', presentation at the forum held between officers of the UN ad hoc criminal 
tribunals and national prosecuting authorities, East Africa Hotel, Arusha, Tanzania, 26–28 November, 2008, at § 
32. 
46 Decision on an Amicus Curiae application and on the ‘Requête tenant à obtenir présentations des témoins 
DRC D02 P 0350, DRC D02 P 0236, DRC D02 P 0228 aux autorités néerlandaises aux fins d’asile’ (articles 68 
and 93(7) of the Statute), Katanga and Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-01/07-3003-tENG), Trial Chamber II, 9 June 
2011, § 64. There is also support for this stance from the ICTR: Decision on the Motion by an Acquitted Person 
for Cooperation from Canada, Article 28 of the Statute, Ntagerura (ICTR-99-46-A28), Trial Chamber III, 15 
May 2008, § 4 — the obligation to cooperate under the Statute does not imply that a state should grant residency 
to a person; it is suffifient that the state consults with the Court about the issue.  
47 For an overview see B. Henry, 'The Acquitted Accused, a Forgotten Party of the ICTR', 12 New England 
Journal of International and Comparative Law (2005-2006) 81. 
48 In the case of Ntagerura, more than 10 years, supra note 15. 
49 Henry, supra note 47, at 86, conversation with the ICTR Registrar. The reference is correct, unless you refer 
to the layout of the reference? I have added the author’s name now 
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victims, and their families to consider. These individuals, who continue to live in the affected 
areas, might require protection from retaliation for their involvement in the trial(s). To this 
end, the ICC works with the local authorities to create infrastructures of protection which 
remain in place as long as the risk does. In other words, the ICC operates a witness protection 
programme.50 This same infrastructure might also be used to protect acquitted or released 
persons returning home at the conclusion of their involvement with the ICC.  
It is the nature of these protection infrastructures that they remain largely confidential, 
with the consequence that relatively little is known of them. However, there is one example 
for which some information is available. The Initial Response System (IRS) is an emergency 
hotline that protected individuals can use, should their security be threatened. Use of the 
hotline activates a network of local partners with the capacity to extract the individual and 
move them to a safe place.51 While it is often the local police who run the IRS system, it is 
the ICC Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) which manages and funds it.52 The ICC is 
involved in training the officers, regularly tests the system’s efficacy and responsiveness, and 
maintains regular contact with the local authorities.53 The IRS is a way of bolstering the 
capacity of local authorities which — as a consequence of corruption, conflict, or other 
reasons — might be unable to provide the necessary level of protection when acting without 
assistance. That being said, an effective IRS still requires a certain level of stability in the 
country. Following the conflict and change of government in the CAR, only a limited IRS 
could be maintained.54 
The IRS is currently used for protected witnesses, but it has the potential to be used 
for other individuals also. Depending on the level and severity of the threat, a person released 
or acquitted by the ICC could return to their home country to an area covered by an IRS, and 
                                                 
50 Reg. 96, Regulations of the Registry: ‘The Registry shall take all necessary measures to maintain a protection 
programme for witnesses, victims who appear before the Court and persons at risk’; Reg. 93: ‘The Registry 
shall implement measures for the protection of witnesses, victims, who appear before the Court and persons at 
risk on the territory of the state of their residence’. Further on this see M. Eikel, 'Witness Protection Measures at 
the International Criminal Court: Legal Framework and Emerging Practice', 23 Criminal Law Forum (2012) 97; 
S. Arbia, 'The International Criminal Court: witness and victim protection and support, legal aid and family 
visits',  36 Commonwealth Law Bulletin (2010) 519, at 521; C. Mahony, 'The Justice Sector Afterthought: 
Witness Protection in Africa', Institute for Security Studies (2010), ISBN 978-1-920422-07-3, at 18; 
International Bar Association, Witnesses before the International Criminal Court: An international Bar 
Association International Criminal Court Programme report on the ICC's efforts and challenges to protect, 
support and ensure the rights of witnesses (2013).  
51 Human Rights Watch, Courting History: The Landmark International Criminal Court's First Years (2008) at 
152–153. 
52 Eikel, supra note 50, at 121. 
53 Report of the Court on the Kampala Field Office: activities, challenges and review of staffing levels; and on 
memoranda of understanding with situation countries, ICC-ASP/9/11, 30 July 2010. 
54 Ibid. 
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use it when threatened. Importantly, the feasibility of using existing infrastructures of 
protection greatly depends on the source of the threat. If third parties are the source of the 
danger to the person, and the domestic government is merely unable to protect them, then it is 
a plausible solution. However, if the government of the home country is itself the source of 
the threat, the IRS infrastructure becomes less useful. Thus, in these last cases, the existing 
infrastructure for protection could be supplemented by the use of assurances.  
 
C. Assurances 
Just as with using the existing protection infrastructure, assurances are a potential way of 
minimizing the risk and allowing acquitted or released individuals to return to their home 
state. Assurances are particularly relevant where the home state itself is the source of the 
danger. For example, a home state might undertake that an individual will not be ill-treated 
on their return, and offer a number of guarantees to this effect.  
In the past, assurances have been used in ICC practice in relation to witnesses. A 
number of detained witnesses who were transferred from the DRC to the ICC to give 
evidence claimed that if they were returned to the DRC they would be subject to a continued 
violation of their right to liberty.55 They had been detained in the DRC without trial for a 
number of years, a situation that seemed set to continue, and they were concerned that their 
testimony before the ICC against the DRC government would place them at risk of ill 
treatment. In order to secure their return while at the same time guaranteeing their safety,56 
the ICC was given a number of assurances from the DRC, some of which were quite 
intrusive: the DRC was required to place the detained witnesses in a facility offering 
maximum security, with specially trained guards; if the witnesses were moved, the VWU was 
to be informed; the VWU was to have access to them twice a week on a confidential basis; 
and the VWU was to attend their trial to monitor fairness.57 The VWU was given the overall 
responsibility of monitoring compliance with the assurances, and another assessment was to 
be made after the conclusion on their trial.  
                                                 
55 For more details, see among others: de Boer and Zieck, supra note 24; E. Irving, 'Protecting Witnesses at the 
International Criminal Court from Refoulement', 12 JICJ (2014) 1141; G. Sluiter, 'Shared Responsibility in 
International Criminal Justice: The ICC and Asylum', 10 JICJ (2012) 661; J. van Wijk, 'When International 
Criminal Justice Collides with Principles of International Protection: Assessing the Consequences of ICC 
Witnesses Seeking Asylum, Defendants Being Acquitted, and Convicted Being Released', 26 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2013) 173. 
56 Because they were witnesses, the ICC had a specific obligation to protect them under Art. 68 ICCSt.  
57 Decision on the security situation of three detained witnesses in relation to their testimony before the Court 
(art. 68 of the Statute) and Order to request cooperation from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to provide 
assistance in ensuring their protection in accordance with article 93(1)(j) of the Statute, Katanga and (ICC-
01/04-01/07-3033), Trial Chamber II, 22 June 2011, § 41. 
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The nature of the ‘state-ICC’ assurances given in relation to the witnesses were 
different from those that could have been given in a ‘state-state’ context. States are precluded 
by sovereignty from being able to directly monitor compliance with assurances. It is in part 
for this reason that extensive criteria have been developed by the ECtHR on when assurances 
can be considered sufficient to safeguard rights.58 In this respect, assurances given by a state 
to the ICC may provide more guarantees than those given between states. In state-state 
scenarios, monitoring compliance with assurances depends on international bodies or 
diplomatic channels. This is not so with the ICC, where the presence of Court personnel on 
the ground helps the Court to itself monitor compliance . As already described, VWU staff 
members are able to visit the individuals in question, follow trials, be involved in training 
special prison guards, and so on. These staff members are independent and protected from 
arrest or interference by immunities. While this does not counteract other disadvantages that 
relying on assurances can have, it does in some respect place the ICC in a stronger position to 
ensure the rights of those it would return to a state. In particular, even though the ICC — 
unlike states — cannot threaten economic sanctions or other forms of pressure, receiving 
states may be more cautious of ignoring assurances when they are being so closely watched.  
The extent of assurances given by the DRC in the case of the detained witnesses hints at the 
possibility of this mechanism being used in other situations too. Naturally, the assurances 
would take a different form if the individual was at liberty rather than detained, although — 
as the Katanga situation described above shows — returning home after being released by 
the ICC does not guarantee liberty. Unfortunately, this otherwise optimistic picture must be 
tempered by the reality of the detained witnesses’ situation since their return to the DRC. A 
report from December 2015 showed that the detained witnesses are yet to be tried, despite 
being returned in August 2014.59 The effectiveness of the ICC’s monitoring system following 
assurances is therefore not watertight.  
 
5. Conclusion 
There is space for optimism that the ICC could potentially play a stronger role in preventing 
UbU situations from occurring, or addressing them where they do arise, with regards to those 
it acquits or those released on completion of sentence. Beyond the steps the ICC already 
takes, there is potential for the Court to use its position and existing infrastructures to play an 
                                                 
58 Case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 8139/09, judgment of 17 January 2012, at § 
189.  
59 Supra note 35. 
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even bigger role. However, as noted above, each proposed solution carries its own limitations 
due to the ICC’s inherent structural features. And so, this article should be seen as the starting 
point for further discussion on the role that other actors can play, alongside the ICC. While 
this article was limited to the ICC, states are in many ways the missing piece of the 
discussion: enforcement states, the host state, and other States Parties. Only a combination of 
their efforts can effectively address the UbU issue in the ICC context.  
Immigration policy is central to state sovereignty — a state must be permitted to 
control those who enter and remain on its territory. A corollary of this is that states are free, 
to the extent permitted by their international obligations, to exclude from protection 
individuals they consider to be undesirable. However, some international obligations may 
preclude the individual’s removal even if they are denied refugee protection. When such a 
situation occurs, it is generally a bilateral matter between the protection state and the 
individual in question; UbU situations arising from ICC proceedings are different. 
Individuals acquitted or released by the ICC are placed in the position of being UbU, at least 
in part, because of their involvement with the Court. After all, they are present on foreign 
territory precisely because of their trial, and where convicted, their sentence. Furthermore, 
their status as former ICC defendants may make states even more reluctant to host such 
individuals.  
All states that negotiated the Rome Statute and which subsequently joined it should be 
concerned that the ICC — created to bring justice to victims of human rights violations —not 
leave individuals in a legal limbo which potentially gives rise itself to human rights 
violations.60 As Bonjani Majola, the ICTR Registrar, stated: ‘[i]t weakens the arguments that 
people should be taken to an international criminal tribunal if they are going to become 
stateless after the whole process’.61 States have, then, a strong incentive to work 
collaboratively, and be open and willing to adopt solutions. To fail to do so undermines an 
international institution that has been over 50 years in the making.  
It has been noted that the UbU problem in international criminal justice is not limited 
to the ICC. Problems of this type have notoriously affected the ICTR, and can be said to 
stretch back to Nuremberg. More significantly, the problem is not limited to international 
criminal justice only, but affects a large number of individuals all over the world who cross 
borders for an assortment of reasons. The solutions proposed in this article are very closely 
                                                 
60 For example, confining an individual to a safe house may affect their right to liberty.  
61 ‘Rwanda genocide court’s stranded men’, Aljazeera America, 30 December 2014, available online at 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/12/30/rwanda-ictr-tanzania.html (visited 4 January 2016). 
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tied to the ICC’s special nature, and are not necessarily suited to be applied elsewhere. The 
circumstances of the ICC’s creation and continuing existence constitute an incentive for 
collaborative state action that is often otherwise lacking, and its institutional structure gives 
the ICC tools that states lack in their bilateral relations with each other. An existing 
protection infrastructure inside the home state, the presence of Court organs to oversee its 
effectiveness, and the ICC capacity for coordinating states’ efforts and communications are 
just examples of what makes the Court unsual. While international bodies such as the 
UNHCR or other UN agencies may play a similar role, it is also possible that measures 
adopted by the ICC are not transposable to other situations.  
Ultimately, and returning to the ICC context, it may have to be considered that the 
solution to UbU acquitted and released persons is further from our grasp than we think. 
Indeed, it may be indicative of a deeper issue affecting international criminal justice. A 
failure by a state to protect acquitted or released persons when they return home, or 
collaboration by that state in the danger facing these individuals, is symptomatic of a 
disconnect and lack of trust between individual states and the international criminal justice 
mechanisms addressing their nationals. A failure by the international community at large to 
host at-risk acquitted or released persons is symptomatic of a lack of commitment to, and 
investment in, criminal justice at the international level. This larger trend must also be 
addressed.  
 
